We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both receipt-freeness and end-to-end verifiability. It is receipt-free in a strong sense, meaning that even dishonest voters cannot prove how they voted. We provide a game-based definition of receipt-freeness for voting protocols with non-interactive ballot casting, which we name strong receipt-freeness (sRF). To our knowledge, sRF is the first game-based definition of receipt-freeness in the literature, and it has the merit of being particularly concise and simple. Built upon the Helios protocol, BeleniosRF inherits its simplicity and does not require any anti-coercion strategy from the voters. We implement BeleniosRF and show its feasibility on a number of platforms, including desktop computers and smartphones.
INTRODUCTION
Electronic voting protocols should achieve two antagonistic security goals: privacy and verifiability. Additionally, they must be practical, from a usability, operational, and efficiency point of view. Privacy can be expressed via several, increasingly demanding security properties.
• Basic ballot privacy guarantees that no one can learn how a voter voted.
• Receipt-freeness ensures that a voter cannot prove to anyone how she voted. While privacy protects honest voters, receipt-freeness aims at protecting vote privacy even when voters willingly interact with an attacker.
• Coercion-resistance should allow an honest voter to cast her vote even if she is, during some time, fully under the control of an attacker. Coercion-resistance typically requires revoting.
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CCS '16, October 24 -28, 2016 , Vienna, Austria Conversely, verifiability ensures that voters' ballots are included in the ballot box (individual verifiability), that the result corresponds to the content of the ballot box (universal verifiability) and that ballots come only from voters entitled to vote (eligibility verifiability). Helios [3, 4] is a scheme that "only" achieves privacy and verifiability and is based on a voting system by Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers [25] with modifications proposed by Benaloh [7] . It has been used in several elections such as that of the president of UC Louvain in Belgium, and of the Board of Directors of the IACR since 2011 [1] . As emphasized by its authors, Helios should only be used in low-coercion environments. Indeed, a voter may reveal the randomness used to compute her ballot; one can then re-encrypt the claimed vote and check if the encryption is contained in the public bulletin board. Helios is thus not receipt-free.
To our knowledge, Civitas [21, 37] is the only scheme that achieves both verifiability and coercion-resistance, without requiring a great deal of interaction between the ballot box or the election authorities and the voter (such as [8, 20] ). While the scheme is a foundational work, it seems difficult to use it in large-scale elections mainly for two reasons. First, the tally phase requires O(n 2 ) operations where n is the number of received ballots, which opens the way to denial-of-service attacks. Second, to achieve coercion-resistance, a voter should be able to adopt an anti-coercion strategy (in Civitas, a voter has to lie about her true credential) and then later revote for her true choice once she is freed from the attacker. We believe that this scenario is unrealistic in many cases, as it requires cryptographic skills and a heavy infrastructure to realize an untappable channel (e.g. in-person registration).
It is also worth noticing that in most countries revoting is not allowed, as for example in Australia, France, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The only exceptions we are aware of are Estonia and the Internet voting pilots for the parliamentary elections in 2011 and 2013 in Norway. While this way of thinking might be a cultural aspect inherited from traditional paper ballot systems, it is foreseeable that it will take time before countries change their electoral rules in order to adopt a revote policy.
Our Contributions
Building upon a recent variant of Helios, called Belenios [22, 30] , and a cryptographic primitive called signatures on randomizable ciphertexts [12] , we propose a receipt-free version of Helios, which we call BeleniosRF. In our scheme a voter cannot prove how she voted, even if she is provided with all the ballot material by the coercer. Interestingly, our scheme does not demand any strategy of the voter; in particular, it does not require the active participation of a voter to deceive a coercer that is asking for a receipt. For example, a voter does not need to lie or produce fake credentials as in Civitas, she simply has no way to prove how she voted. This represents a huge improvement in usability from the voter's point of view: all that is required of the voter is to vote.
We show that our scheme BeleniosRF is receipt-free in a strong sense, meaning that even a dishonest voter using a voting client that has been tampered with cannot prove how she voted. We formalize this property, called strong receipt-freeness (sRF), via a game-based definition building on the privacy definition recently proposed by Bernhard et al. [9] . We view this formal definition of receipt-freeness, which applies to non-interactive ballot casting protocols, as the first contribution of this work. We call it strong receipt-freeness to emphasize that in non-interactive protocols an attacker has less room to build a receipt. Indeed, in the absence of interaction the adversary does not obtain information from the voting server apart from what is displayed on the bulletin board; hence any receipt must be built by the adversary locally and before submitting the ballot.
We claim sRF is the first game-based receipt-freeness definition in the literature accounting for a voter that is corrupted during the voting phase. Additionally, sRF has the merit of being simple and concise, potentially allowing for simpler proofs. In doing so we give a new formulation for the receiptfreeness definition by Benaloh and Tuinstra [8] and highlight that receipt-freeness can be achieved without asking the voters to vote several times and cancel previously submitted ballots, and without requiring an untappable channel. All we need to assume is that the attacker is not permanently eavesdropping the communication between the voting server and the voter, an assumption made by all previous constructions of receipt-free or coercion-resistant voting schemes.
A key ingredient of BeleniosRF is a randomization service, a role that we assume is played by the voting server, but which could be played by a different server. The randomization service is in charge of re-randomizing the ballot cast by a voter. BeleniosRF's receipt-freeness then relies on the fact that the randomness contained in the ballot displayed in the bulletin board is not under the control of the voter. Both the voter and the randomization service contribute to the randomness of the voter's ballot as displayed on the bulletin board. In fact, in light of the impossibility result of [19] , the existence of a randomization agent is assumed in most constructions that claim to be receipt-free. Here however, we do not rely on letting voters vote multiple times or on the existence of a trusted token for each voter (such as e.g. [20, 34, 35, 43] ).
The foremost challenge in achieving receipt-freeness noninteractively and via a randomization service is to prevent the latter from changing the voter's intent. The only existing non-interactive proposal [12] claiming receipt-freeness uses a powerful cryptographic primitive called signatures on randomizable ciphertexts. It consists of a signature scheme and a public-key encryption scheme that is randomizable (that is, given a ciphertext, anyone can create a fresh ciphertext of the same plaintext-without knowing it). The primitive provides an additional functionality: given a signature on a ciphertext, anyone can randomize the ciphertext and adapt the signature to the new ciphertext, that is, produce a signature that is valid on the new ciphertext-and all that knowing neither the decryption key nor the signing key nor the plaintext. On the other hand, unforgeability guarantees that it is infeasible to compute a signature on a ciphertext that encrypts a message of which no encryption has been signed.
Alas, Blazy et al. [12] did not provide a receipt-freeness definition nor a proof. By exhibiting a ballot-copying attack adapted from [24] , we demonstrate that their scheme is not receipt-free, worse, it is not even ballot-private. Our scheme fixes the Blazy et al. construction by binding the ciphertexts to voters, while still inheriting the randomizability from Groth-Sahai non-interactive proofs [32] .
We start with giving a new instantiation of signatures on randomizable ciphertexts, which we show yields an RCCAsecure public-key encryption scheme [16] , from which we build a non-interactive 1 receipt-free e-voting scheme as follows:
• As in Belenios, each voter is provided with a signature key pair, in addition to authentication means to the ballot box (typically a login and password).
• Each voter encrypts and signs their ballot and includes a proof of knowledge to prevent ballot malleability.
• Upon receiving a ballot, the server re-randomizes the ballot and adapts the corresponding signature and proof before publishing it.
Receipt-freeness comes from the fact that a voter no longer has control over, nor knowledge of, the randomness used to form the final ballot stored in the ballot box. On the other hand, even after the voting server re-randomizes the ballot cast by the voter's voting device, the voter can still verify that her legitimate ballot is present, as the re-randomized ciphertext comes with a signature that is valid under the voter's verification key. By unforgeability of the signature primitive, the vote cannot have been altered by the ballot box, which we show implies verifiability. Our final contribution consists of assessing the feasibility of BeleniosRF; for this purpose we implemented and measured the efficiency of a Javascript voting client (see Section 5).
Related Work
Our definition requires that an adversary cannot distinguish whether a voter votes for either a or b, even if the attacker provides the voter in advance with all the cryptographic material (such as randomness to be used to cast the ballot). Interestingly, this definition does not require the voter to follow a "strategy" to fool the coercer.
The early definitions of receipt-freeness [8, 43] introduced the idea that an attacker should not be able to distinguish between a real transcript and a fake one, but their descriptions are rather informal. A weaker definition of receipt-freeness, proposed in [15, 38] , lets the attacker only interact with the voter after the election (in particular, the attacker cannot control the randomness of the voter's device). A simulationbased definition for receipt-freeness (UC-RF) was given in [42] . It assumes however that the voters adopt an "anti-coercion strategy" and is therefore closer to coercion-resistance as defined in [37] , even if it does not cover, for instance, abstention attacks. Since BeleniosRF does not require any anti-coercion strategy from the voters, and game-based security definitions are known to be easier to work with, we opted not to use UC-RF to analyze the receipt-freeness of our new protocol. The coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness definitions in [40] also assume a strategy from the voter. Our definition can be seen as a formalization of one of the other possible strategies sketched in the paper.
Similarly, the symbolic definition of receipt-freeness in [26] also requires the voter to adopt a strategy to fool the adversary. Other definitions in symbolic models aim at characterizing the notion of a receipt [14, 33, 36] but (as usual in symbolic models) they are much more abstract than standard computational models.
Previous receipt-free schemes. The scheme by Kiayias et al. [38] only achieves receipt-freeness for honest voters, as discussed above. Other well-known and deployed schemes include Prêt-à-voter [44] and Scantegrity [18] . These systems however are designed for elections with physical voting booths. The system used in Estonia [46] and the one deployed in Norway [5, 29] might possibly satisfy some level of receipt-freeness, as the corresponding ballot boxes are not publicly available. But because of this, they do not achieve universal verifiability (in contrast to BeleniosRF). Kulyk et al. [39] propose an extension of Helios where voters may later cancel their vote, still being indistinguishable from null votes submitted by the crowd. In addition to being difficult to deploy in practice, this scheme strongly relies on revoting. Hirt's scheme [34] heavily depends on the existence of untappable channels. Selene [45] proposes an enhancement for receipt-free schemes, applicable to BeleniosRF, to ease the verification step made by voters through tracking numbers.
BeleniosRF can be seen as realizing receipt-freeness under the assumption that the voting server, which is in charge of running the ballot box, can be trusted to re-randomize ballots and not reveal the randomness used for that procedure. In contrast, Helios [41] and [38] achieve receipt-freeness under the assumption that the voting client is not going to reveal the randomness it used for sealing the vote. The latter seems difficult to ensure in practice, unless voters are provided with secure hardware tokens. In contrast, BeleniosRF only needs the voting server to be protected against randomness leakage.
BeleniosRF has one disadvantage compared to Helios and Belenios: if the registrar and the voting server collude, they can undetectably change a voter's choice. This is due to the features that guarantee receipt-freeness, namely that signatures on different ciphertexts encrypting the same message cannot be linked, and that the registrar generates the voters' signing keys (and thus can vote on their behalf). This can be prevented by defining a less powerful registrar that simply grants voting rights to signing keys that are generated by the voters themselves (cf. Section 4.3). This solution differs from the Belenios approach, where voters receive their signing keys from the registrar for the sake of usability. This is just another manifestation of the usual tension between usability, privacy and verifiability in e-voting systems (and computer security systems in general), in the sense that increasing one of them entails a decrease of at least one of the others.
RECEIPT-FREENESS
We now formally define receipt-freeness and start by providing the syntax of a voting system, inspired by [9, 22] .
Syntax of a Voting System
Election systems typically involve several entities. For the sake of simplicity we consider each entity to consist of only one individual but note that all of them could be thresholdized.
1. Election administrator : denoted by E, is responsible for setting up the election; it publishes the identities id of eligible voters, the list of candidates and the result function ρ of the election (typically counting the number of votes received by every candidate).
2.
Registrar : denoted by R, is responsible for distributing secret credentials to voters and registering the corresponding public credentials.
3. Trustee: denoted by T , is in charge of tallying and publishing a final result.
4.
Voters: the eligible voters are denoted by id1, . . . , idτ .
5. Ballot-box (voting server) manager : denoted by B, is responsible for processing and storing valid ballots in the ballot box BB, and for publishing PBB, the public view of BB, also called (public) bulletin board.
The following syntax considers single-pass schemes, that is, systems where voters only have to post a single message to the board, i.e. ballot casting is non-interactive. A voting protocol V = (Setup, Register, Vote, Valid, Append, Publish, VerifyVote, Tally, Verify) is relative to a family of result functions {ρτ } τ ≥1 for τ ∈ N, with ρτ :
where V is the set of admissible votes and R is the result space.
Setup(1 λ ), on input a security parameter 1 λ , outputs an election public/secret key pair (pk, sk), where pk could contain a list of credentials L. We let pk be an implicit input of the remaining algorithms.
Register(id), on input an identifier id, outputs the secret part of the credential usk id and its public credential upk id , which is added to the list L = {upk id }.
Vote(id, upk, usk, v) is run by voter id with credentials upk, usk to cast her vote v ∈ V. It outputs a ballot b, which is sent to the voting server (possibly through an authenticated channel).
Valid(BB, b) takes as input the ballot box BB and a ballot b and checks the validity of the latter. It returns for valid ballots and ⊥ for invalid ones (e.g. ill-formed, containing duplicated ciphertext from the ballot box. . . ).
Append(BB, b) updates BB with the ballot b. Typically, this consists in adding b as a new entry to BB, but more involved actions might be possible (as in our scheme).
Publish(BB) outputs the public view PBB of BB. Often one simply has Publish(BB) = BB.
VerifyVote(PBB, id, upk, usk, b) is run by voters for checking that their ballots will be included in the tally. On inputs the public board PBB, a ballot b, and the voter's identity and credentials id, usk, upk, it returns or ⊥.
Tally(BB, sk) on inputs the ballot box BB and the secret key sk, outputs the tally r and a proof of correct tabulation Π. If the election is declared invalid then r := ⊥.
Verify(PBB, r, Π), on inputs the public bulletin board PBB and (r, Π), checks whether Π is a valid proof of correct tallying for r. If so, it returns , and ⊥ otherwise.
The exact implementation of these algorithms depends on the concrete voting protocol. In particular, the notion of public and private credentials of a voter varies a lot. For example upk id might be simply the identity of the voter or may correspond to her signature-verification key.
Strong Receipt-Freeness
Intuitively, privacy ensures that an adversary cannot learn the vote of an honest voter. Receipt-freeness furthermore guarantees that a voter cannot prove how she voted, even if she willingly provides information to, or follows instructions by, the adversary. This captures the seminal intuition from Benaloh and Tuinstra [8] . The latter insisted that a reasonably private electronic voting protocol should emulate traditional voting in a voting booth: it should allow voters to conceal their individual votes and, at the same time, prevent them from revealing their vote. Voters should not be able to give away the privacy of their vote granted by the voting protocol, even if they are willing to.
Building upon a definition of privacy recently introduced [9] , we argue that this requirement can be formalized for singlepass schemes by simply providing the adversary with an additional oracle OreceiptLR, which allows him to submit his own ballots on behalf of a dishonest voter. Apart from immediately implying ballot privacy, this simple formalization captures several important scenarios:
• A voter who wants to convince a vote buyer of how she voted may prepare her ballot in an arbitrary way that allows him to construct a convincing receipt (e.g., consider a voter that uses biased random coins to build her ballot and to prove how she voted [28] ).
• A voter that might have been corrupted before the ballot casting phase may just follow the instructions given to her by the adversary (as in [37] ).
• A voter can record, but also forge, its interaction with the ballot box (as in [8] ).
As in previous formal or intuitive definitions of receiptfreeness, we assume the adversary is not monitoring the interaction between the voter and the voting server. However, the voter can record this interaction, and later on present this information (or any transformation thereof) to the adversary.
Formally, we consider two games, Game 0 and Game 1, defined by the oracles in Figure 1 . In both games BB0 and BB1 are ballot boxes that start out empty. Box BB0 corresponds to the real election (that will be tallied) and BB1 is a fake ballot box which the adversary's task is to distinguish from BB0. In Game β the adversary has indirect access to BB β , that is, she can see the public part of that box at any time. The game Exp srf,β A,V provides an adversary A access to the oracles defined in Figure 1 , which intuitively proceed as follows:
Oinit generates secret and public keys for the election; the public key is returned to the adversary. If β = 1, it also returns auxiliary information aux to be used by a simulator SimProof introduced below.
Oreg, on input an identifier id, initializes id's credentials (upk, usk) by running Register(id). It gives upk to the adversary.
Ocorrupt is used by the attacker to obtain the credentials (upk, usk) of a registered voter.
OvoteLR, a left-or-right oracle, takes two potential votes (v0, v1) for an honest user id, produces ballots b0 and b1 for these votes and places them in the ballot boxes (one in BB0 and one in BB1), provided that v0, v1 ∈ V.
Ocast allows the adversary to cast a ballot b on behalf of any party. If the ballot is valid with respect to BB β , it is placed in both ballot boxes.
OreceiptLR allows an adversarial voter id to cast a ballot b1 in BB1 and a ballot b0 in BB0. If each ballot b0, b1 is valid with respect to its respective ballot box, then the ballots are appended by running Append(BB0, b0) and Append(BB1, b1). This allows the adversary to encode special instructions in the ballots that could later serve as the basis for a vote receipt (e.g. as in [28] ).
Oboard models the adversary's ability to see the publishable part of the board. It returns Publish(BB β ).
Otally allows the adversary to see the result of the election. In both games the result is obtained by tallying a valid BB0; the proof of correct tabulation is however simulated in the second world, i.e., for β = 1.
We demand that the adversary first calls Oinit, then oracles Oreg, OcorruptU, OvoteLR, Ocast, OreceiptLR, Oboard in any order, and any number of times. Finally, A can call Otally; after it receives its reply, A must return a guess of the bit β. The guess bit is the result returned by the game.
Inherited from ballot privacy [9] , Definition 1 uses simulators SimSetup and SimProof to model the fact that the proof should not reveal anything, as it is "zero-knowledge".
D e f i n i t i o n 1 ( s R F ) .
Let V = (Setup, Register, Vote, Valid, Append, VerifyVote, Publish, Tally, Verify) be a voting protocol for a set ID of voter identities and a result function ρ. We say that V has strong receipt-freeness if there exist algorithms SimSetup and SimProof such that no efficient adversary can distinguish between games Exp srf,0 B,V (λ) and Exp srf,1 B,V (λ) defined by the oracles in Figure 1 ; that is, for any efficient algorithm A the following is negligible in λ:
In protocols with non-interactive ballot casting an adversary does not receive any output from its interaction with the ballot box (apart from the public view of the protocol run), the sRF adversary must therefore build a receipt using local data only, and before casting the ballot. An adversary might encode arbitrary instructions in b β , for instance making those instructions dependent on the vote v β ; e.g. he could set the least significant bit of b β equal to v β ∈ {0, 1}. Intuitively, strong receipt-freeness implies that a ballot b0 could be replaced by a ballot b1, both submitted via the oracle OreceiptLR, without the adversary noticing. Thus a receipt, i.e. a proof for a certain vote having been cast, cannot exist as OreceiptLR captures all what a RF adversary can do.
This definition does not assume that the voter is capable of successfully applying some anti-coercion strategy (in contrast to [42] ). We believe this to be important in practice for two reasons. First, this is of course much easier to use: with our definition, the system is receipt-free by construction and there is no need to instruct voters how they should proceed to lie about their vote. Second, we need not assume that revoting is allowed (our definition accommodates any revoting policy though, including no revote). This is important since most countries forbid revoting.
If id was not previously queried, then run Register(id) and set U = U ∪ {(id, upk id , usk id )}; return upk id .
OcorruptU(id)
On a registered voter id, output (upk id , usk id ) and set CU = CU ∪ {(id, upk id )}.
return (r, Π ) A,V (λ) for β = 0, 1. The games differ in the way the tallying oracle creates auxiliary data, in the board displayed in response to Oboard queries, and the board against which ballots are validated.
As expected, strong receipt-freeness trivially implies BPRIV privacy [9] , since BPRIV equals sRF except that there is no oracle OreceiptLR.
Helios. Under the RF definition provided in [38] the Helios protocol would be receipt-free. In contrast, under our definition Helios is not receipt-free. Indeed, if the adversary is allowed to cast different ballots b0, b1 to the ballot boxes BB0, BB1, respectively, then distinguishing Game 0 from Game 1 is trivial. This is due to the fact that in Helios PBB contains the encryption of the votes, so it suffices for an adversary to produce different encryptions c, d and check which one is showing up when calling oracle Oboard.
Interestingly, we believe that a Helios instantiation in which voting devices are built upon trusted hardware tokens that conceal the randomness used for encryption (as proposed by Magkos et al. [41] ) satisfies sRF, when interpreting trusted tokens as preventing A from accessing the OreceiptLR oraclein which case sRF collapses to ballot privacy. This shows the flexibility of our definition. Moreover, we are confident that the same result applies to [38] .
BUILDING BLOCKS
Before describing our voting scheme, we first present the necessary cryptographic building blocks.
Assumptions and Primitives
We will work in asymmetric bilinear groups and assume the existence of a bilinear-group generator GrpGen, which on input 1 λ outputs (p, G1, G2, g1, g2, GT , e), where p is a prime of length λ, G1, G2 and GT are cyclic groups of order p, g1 is a generator of G1, g2 is a generator of G2, and e is a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT such that e(g1, g2) generates GT . The following was discussed in [13, p. 304 ] and defined in [12] . ElGamal Encryption. We define encryption for messages in G1 from an asymmetric bilinear group G = (p, G1, G2, g1, g2, GT , e) and show that it is randomizable.
This scheme is IND-CPA secure assuming hardness of DDH in G1, which follows from SXDH. It is perfectly randomizable as Random(pk, Encrypt(pk, M ; r); r ) = Encrypt(pk, M ; r + r ).
Groth-Sahai Proofs. Groth-Sahai (GS) proofs [32] allow us to prove satisfiability of equations involving group elements from G1 or G2 and scalars. We will use them to prove consistency and knowledge of encryptions. On input a bilinear group G, Setupgs outputs a common reference string (CRS)
The CRS is used to commit to group elements X ∈ G1, which we denote by C1(X), and elements Y ∈ G2, denoted by C2(Y ). Moreover, C i (x) denotes a commitment to a scalar, which can be made in G1 (i = 1) and G2 (i = 2). The GS system lets us prove that committed values satisfy certain equations.
Under a CRS computed via Setupgs, commitments are perfectly binding and the proofs are perfectly sound. That is, the values uniquely determined by the commitments satisfy the proved equation. Moreover, the committed values can be extracted using an extraction trapdoor ξ that can be computed together with the CRS. We denote this by (crs, ξ) [27] , that is, given commitments and proofs, one can (without knowing the witness) create a fresh set of commitments and proofs.
There is an alternative CRS-generation algorithm Setup
(h) g s , which outputs (crs , td). Commitments made under crs contain no information about the committed value and the trapdoor td allows simulation of proofs. As CRSs output by Setupgs and Setup (h) g s are indistinguishable under SXDH, GS proofs are computationally zero-knowledge. Moreover, GS proofs are randomizable
Signatures on Randomizable Ciphertexts
The primitive introduced by Blazy et al. [12] 
As the signature and the encryption scheme are used together, these algorithms have extensions Sign + and Verify + , which additionally take the encryption key pk as input; and Encrypt + , Decrypt + , which also take the verification key vk.
Randomizability. The main feature of signatures on randomizable ciphertexts (SRC) is an algorithm Random + , which takes pk, vk, a ciphertext c under pk and a signature σ on c valid under vk, and outputs a re-randomization c of c together with a signature σ , valid on c .
An output of Random + is distributed like a fresh encryption of the plaintext of c and a fresh signature on it; formally, for all messages m, (pk, dk) ∈ [EKeyGen(G)], (vk, sk) ∈ [SKeyGen(G)], c ∈ [Encrypt + (pk, vk, m)], σ ∈ [Sign + (sk, pk, c)], the following two random variables are equally distributed:
Unforgeability. Unforgeability of signatures on randomizable ciphertext is defined via the following experiment:
The challenger computes a signature key pair and an encryption key pair (sk, vk), (dk, pk) and runs the adversary on (vk, pk, dk). It is also given access to an oracle Sign + (sk, pk, ·), which it can query adaptively on ciphertexts c1, . . . , cq of its choice. Finally, the adversary outputs a pair (c * , σ * ) and wins if Verify + (vk, pk, c * , σ * ) = 1 and m = Decrypt + (dk, vk, c * ) is different from all mi := Decrypt + (dk, vk, ci).
Our SRC Construction
At a high level, we need a construction that enforces our restricted message space and is malleable enough to be rerandomized but no more. The first requirement ensures that voters can only submit valid ballots, while the second gives us privacy via randomization while preventing copying or tampering attacks. Specifically, we use GS proofs to ensure validity and prevent copying or producing ballots related to those of another user. We use signatures to ensure integrity, meaning a randomizer cannot change the ballot contents.
Asymmetric Waters signature scheme. Blazy et al. [12] define a variant of Waters' signature scheme [47] for asymmetric groups that is perfectly randomizable and which they prove secure under the CDH + assumption. G1, G2, GT , e, g1, g2, z, u) .
x ; output the public key vk = (pp, X1, X2) and the secret key sk = (pp, Y ).
Sign(sk = (pp, Y ), m; s): For randomness s ∈ Zp, return the signature σ defined as
Verif(vk = (pp, X1, X2), m, σ): Output 1 if both of the following hold and 0 otherwise:
e(σ1, g2) = e(z, X2) · e(F(m), σ3) e(σ2, g2) = e(g1, σ3)
Random((pp, X1, X2), F, σ; s ): For randomness s ∈ Zp, out-
Note that for Random it suffices to know the hash F = F(m) of the signed message. The scheme is perfectly randomizable, as for any ((pp, R e m a r k 1. Blazy et al. [12] show that their signature scheme also satisfies a (stronger) EUF-CMA notion, where the adversary's signing queries are of the form (m, R, T ) and if e(T, g2) = e(R, X2) then the oracle returns an additional signature element σ4 = R s .
We will combine ElGamal encryption, Groth-Sahai proofs and Waters signatures to create an SRC scheme. Our construction extends that of [12] , so that it immediately yields an RCCA-secure encryption scheme (defined below) and ultimately a strongly receipt-free e-voting scheme.
Our SRC scheme. Our scheme is defined for a polynomialsize message space M = {0, 1}
k , that is, we assume k to be logarithmic in the security parameter. Messages m are encrypted as ElGamal ciphertexts of F(m). Decryption works by decrypting a ciphertext to F and then looking for m with F = F(m). We define a function H and add a third ciphertext element c3 = H(vk) r , which will tie the ciphertext to the verification key for which it is produced.
We moreover add Cm, Groth-Sahai commitments to the message bits, and a commitment CT to X r 1 , which is needed for the security reduction (it corresponds to T from Remark 1). Finally, we add GS proofs which show consistency of these commitments, and consistency of the additional ciphertext element c3. In more detail, in order to show a component Cm i of Cm contains a bit, we require commitments in both groups (C1,m,i, C2,m,i) and proofs π i . A commitment Cr to the randomness r is used to prove consistency of the values c1 with Cr, c2 with Cr and {Cm,i} k i=1 , c3 with Cr, as well as CT with X1 and Cr. Now, given ciphertext elements c1 = g r 1 and c2 = F(m)·P r , the crucial observation is that, due to the interoperability of ElGamal encryption and Waters signatures, a signer can produce an encryption of a signature on the plaintext, without knowing the latter: setting σ1 = c . Finally, in order to enable full randomization of ciphertext/signature pairs, we also include P s in the signature. Let Setup (for Waters signatures), Setupgs (for Groth-Sahai proofs) and KeyGen (for ElGamal encryption) be defined as above, and H : {0, 1} → G1 be defined as
for h = (h1, h2) ∈ G 2 1 and a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1} → Zp. Our scheme is given in Figure 2 . It is based on the scheme from [12] , to which we add the crucial ciphertext elements c3 and πV .
Correctness follows, as Verify + checks, via the pairings, that σ is of the form in (2) for some s. From a ciphertext/signature pair (c, σ) with randomness (r, s), Random + creates a fresh pair (c , σ ) with randomness r + r , s + s (and with randomized proofs). We omit the specific structure of the proofs in π as they will not be relevant to the rest of this work.
T h e o r e m 1. The SRC scheme (Setup, EKeyGen, SKeyGen, Encrypt
R e m a r k 2. We will prove a stronger statement, namely that our SRC scheme is unforgeable even when the adversary only needs to output a "partial" forgery (c1, c2, {C1,m,i, C2,m,i}, Cr, πr, πm), (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4), i.e., it need not contain c3, CT , πT , πV and σ5.
Moreover, note that one can also decrypt ciphertexts using the extraction trapdoor ξ for GS proofs to recover m from Cm, sidestepping the inefficient hash inversion. We let EKeyGen ; it defines (letting r be the unknown randomness in (c1, c2, c3)) σ1 := τ4 = g
s , which is distributed as an SCR signature on c.
Let {m1, . . . , mq} be the extracted (equivalently: decrypted) messages of the signing queries. Assume the adversary outputs a (partial) valid forgery, namely one which only contains (c1, c2, σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4), commitments Cm, Cr and proofs πr, πm. The reduction extracts m from Cm. Then soundness of πr and πm ensures that for some r we have c1 = g 
RCCA-Secure Encryption from SRC
As a next step towards our voting protocol, we show that our SRC scheme, contrary to the one from [12] , yields an RCCA-secure [16] encryption scheme, as defined next.
CCA-security is the standard notion for public-key encryption and implies that ciphertexts are non-malleable. It states that for an efficient adversary which after choosing m0, m1 receives c * it should be impossible to decide whether c * encrypts m0 or m1, even when given an oracle that decrypts any ciphertext c = c * . For randomizable schemes this notion is unachievable, as the adversary could submit a randomization of the challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle. The strongest achievable notion for randomizable schemes is RCCA, where whenever the oracle receives an encryption of m0 or m1, it returns a special symbol .
Based on our SRC scheme we define the following encryption scheme for a polynomial-size message space {0, 1}
k .
KeyGen is defined as EKeyGen.
Encrypt(pk, m):
Random is defined as Random + .
T h e o r e m 2. The above encryption scheme for polynomialsize message spaces is RCCA-secure under the SXDH and the CDH + assumption.
P ro o f S k e t c h . We will give a proof sketch and refer to the full version for a detailed proof. Intuitively, ciphertexts hide the message, since under SXDH we could replace the commitments and proofs in the challenge ciphertext by simulated ones and under DDH, we could replace c2 = F(m)P r by a random element, so the ciphertext would contain no more information about the message. The difficulty is that we need to simulate the decryption oracle. For this we program the hash function H: let vk * be the key contained in the challenge ciphertext; we choose a, b ← $ Zp and set h1 = P −a·H (vk * ) · g b 1 and h2 = P a , which is distributed correctly and set , (c1, c2) ), meaning we can use c3 to decrypt without knowing d; for the challenge ciphertext under vk * we have c3 = g br 1 , so we can embed a DDH challenge. The reduction can thus answer decryption queries containing some vk = vk * , but not if it contains vk * . However, if an adversary submits a valid ciphertext with vk * which does not encrypt the challenge message, then it would break SRC unforgeability, so security of our SRC scheme implies that the adversary cannot make this type of query.
Encrypt + ((pp, crs, h, P ), vk = (pp, X 1 , X 2 ), m; r): Compute, with H defined by h as in (1):
r Make commitments C: For i = 1, . . . , k:
Compute GS proofs π for the following (with r being the value committed in Cr; m i in C 2,m,i ; and w in C T ):
•
Return c := (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , C, π).
Sign
+ (sk = (pp, Y ), (pp, crs, h, P ), c; s): If π is not valid for C, vk, P , return ⊥. Else return c 2 , c 3 , C, π) ; set:
Verify
+ ((pp, X 1 , X 2 ), (pp, crs, h, P ), (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , C, π), σ): Return 1 iff π verifies and the following hold: 
BELENIOSRF
In this section we define Belenios Receipt-Free (BeleniosRF), a strongly receipt-free voting protocol that builds on [12, 22] .
Overview
The election public/secret key pair (pk, sk) is an encryption/extraction key pair generated via EKeyGen (x) (cf. Remark 2), and user key pairs (upk, usk) are signature keys generated by SKeyGen. A user casts a vote by encrypting it via Encrypt + under pk w.r.t. his upk, and uses usk to then sign the ciphertext via Sign + (together, this corresponds to a ciphertext of our RCCA encryption scheme).
When the ballot box receives a valid ballot, it randomizes it via Random + and publishes the resulting ciphertext/signature pair on the public bulletin board PBB. Users can verify that their vote is present, since they can verify the adaptation of their signature on their now-randomized ciphertexts.
Tallying follows standard techniques of e-voting: our construction allows for homomorphic tallying as well as shuffling. In the first case, we take advantage of the special structure of GS commitments, which allow us to calculate a partial tally for each option by adding the corresponding commitment across voters, and then decrypting the resulting commitment (with proof of correctness).
Using shuffling, the encrypted votes are re-randomized and shuffled (and a proof of correct execution of this is generated) via an algorithm Shuffle. Then the ballots are decrypted (again accompanied with a proof that this was done correctly) and the result is published. These proofs make the tallying process publicly verifiable.
We now describe the homomorphic tallying version, where
k , and the result function is simple vector addition. The scheme V BeleniosRF is based on the SCR scheme from Section 3.3 and consists of the following algorithms:
, produce a Fiat-Shamir random oracle proof Πσ that crs, contained in pk, is binding. Return (pk * = (pk, Πσ), sk).
Vote (id, upk, usk, v) is used by a voter to create a ballot b for vote v ∈ V. It computes c ← Encrypt + (pk, upk, v) and σ ← Sign + (usk, pk, c); and returns b = (id, upk, c, σ).
Valid(BB, b) first checks that the ballot b is valid, i.e., that it is well-formed and the signature is correct. Formally, it parses b as (id, upk, c, σ) and checks if -id corresponds to an eligible voter from ID and upk corresponds to the registration of user id; -Verify + (upk, pk, c, σ) = 1.
If any step fails, it returns ⊥; otherwise, it returns .
Append(BB, b = (id, upk, c, σ)) randomizes (c, σ) as (c , σ ) ← Random + (upk, pk, c, σ) and appends to BB a randomized version b = (id, upk, c , σ ) of b.
Publish(BB) takes every entry b = (id, upk, c, σ) in BB and removes elements id, c3, CT , πT , πV and σ5, constructingb := upk, (c1, c2, Cm, Cr, πr, πm), (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4) . It then addsb to PBB, 2 and returns PBB.
VerifyVote(PBB, id, upk, usk, b) browses PBB for an entryb containing upk. If none exists, it returns ⊥. For entryb := upk = (pp, X1, X2), (c1, c2, Cm, Cr, πr, πm), (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4) if πr and πm are valid and e(σ1, g2) = e(c1, σ4) e(σ2, g2) = e(z, X2) · e(c2, σ4) e(σ3, g2) = e(g1, σ4) then return , else return ⊥.
Tally(BB, sk) consists of the following steps. Let N be the number of ballots.
-If there is any ballot b that does not pass Valid(BB, b),
1,m,i . The tally ti for candidate i is produced by decrypting Ti with the GS extraction key ξ = sk.
-Produce the result r = (t1, . . . , t k ) and Π d , a FiatShamir proof of correct extraction.
-Output (r, PBB, Π d ).
Verify(PBB, r, Πσ, Π d ) verifies Πσ w.r.t. crs and Π d w.r.t. PBB and the result r.
Receipt-Freeness
We now show that BeleniosRF satisfies strong receiptfreeness, as defined in Definition 1. Note that this in particular implies vote privacy of BeleniosRF.
T h e o r e m 3. V BeleniosRF is strongly receipt-free under the SXDH assumption in the random-oracle model. P ro o f . The proof uses the ideas of that of Theorem 2. The main one is again to use hash-function programmability and to decrypt a ciphertext (c1, c2, c3) using components c2 and c3 instead of the GS commitments. This will allow us to switch to a hiding CRS, for which the commitments would not be extractable. By randomizability of our SCR scheme and of Groth-Sahai proofs, instead of re-randomizing the ballots in PBB, we can simply recompute them. Finally, having switched to a hiding CRS and a simulated ROM proof thereof, we are able to replace the adversary's view with uniformly distributed values, irrespective of β.
We proceed by a sequence of hybrid games, which we show are indistinguishable:
Hybrid (β,0) is the sRF game Exp srf,β A,V (Definition 1 and Figure 1 ).
Hybrid (β,1) is the same game as Hybrid (β,0) for β = 1; for β = 0 the difference is that the Fiat-Shamir proofs for the CRS and the tally are simulated.
Hybrid (β,0) → Hybrid (β,1): Since ROM proofs can be perfectly simulated by using random-oracle programmability, the two hybrid games are distributed equivalently. Hybrid (β,1) → Hybrid (β,2): It is immediate that both games are distributed equivalently.
Hybrid (β,3) is defined as Hybrid (β,2), but the result is computed differently: each ballot bi = (idi,
and vote vi is defined as the smallest vi ∈ {0, 1} k satisfying F(vi) = Fi. The result is r = (t1, . . . , t k ) with tj = i vi,j.
Hybrid (β,2) → Hybrid (β,3): Perfect soundness of the GS proofs contained in ci guarantees that this alternative way of decryption leads to the same result as extracting the bits of vi from the commitments (we ignore collisions in F which only occur with negligible probability).
Hybrid (β,4) is defined as Hybrid (β, 3) , except that PBB is computed differently: for ballot bi, after extracting vi, instead of re-randomizing bi, we freshly computebi for user i with uski = (pp, Yi) as follows: we pick ri, si ← $ Zp to set
and using witnesses ri and vi, we compute Ci,m, Ci,r and πi,r, πi,m. We setbi = upk i , (ci,1, ci,2, Ci,m, Ci,r, πi,r, πi,m), (σi,1, σi,2, σi,3, σi,4) .
Hybrid (β,3) → Hybrid (β,4): By re-randomizability of our SCR scheme and GS proofs, re-randomized ciphertexts, signatures and proofs are distributed exactly as freshly computed ones. The two hybrids are thus equally distributed.
Hybrid (β,5) is defined as Hybrid (β,4), except that the CRS contained in pk is set up in hiding mode, i.e., computed via Setup Hybrid (β,6) is defined as Hybrid (β,5), except that the commitments and proofs published in PBB are simulated.
Hybrid (β,5) → Hybrid (β,6): By the properties of GS proofs, under a hiding CRS regularly computed proofs and simulated proofs are distributed equivalently; the two hybrids are thus equally distributed.
Hybrid (β,7) is defined as Hybrid (β,6), except that for every i, when computing PBB entrybi, ci,2 is computed as ci,2 = F(vi) · g
Hybrid (β,6) → Hybrid (β,7): The two hybrids are indistinguishable under the DDH assumption in G1, which is proved as follows: we first note that in Hybrid (β,6), d (the decryption key with
is not used anywhere, and ri is only used to compute ci,1 and ci,2 (since the GS commitments and proofs are simulated).
We give a reduction from DDH to distinguishing Hybrids 6 and 7. Let (P = g By random self-reducibility of DDH [6] we can create arbitrarily many instances (P, Ri, Wi), where Ri = g r i 1 for some uniformly random ri, and Wi is independently random if W was, or Wi = g
The simulator now sets pk = (pp, crs, P ), with P from the instance, and ci,1 = Ri and ci,2 = F(vi) · Wi. If Wi = P r i then this is distributed as in Hybrid (β,6), whereas if Wi is random, this is distributed as in Hybrid (β,7).
Observe that Hybrid (0,7) and Hybrid (1,7) are equally distributed, since in both games every ciphertext (ci,1, ci,2) is a uniformly random pair. We have thus constructed a sequence of hybrid games Hybrid (0,0), . . . , Hybrid (0,7), Hybrid (1,7) , . . . , Hybrid (1,0) which are indistinguishable under SXDH and of which the first one corresponds to the sRF game with β = 0 and the last is the sRF game with β = 1. This concludes the proof of strong receipt-freeness.
R e m a r k 3. We note that our scheme can be easily modified and proven secure in the standard model if we assume a trusted CRS: drop Πσ in Setup and use GS proofs fro Π d .
Verifiability
We consider strong verifiability from [22] , which intuitively ensures that the result of the election reflects the votes of:
• All voters who properly checked that their ballot appears in the bulletin board at the end of the election.
In BeleniosRF, a voter should check that one ballot in PBB is signed with her credential.
• A subset of the voters who did not perform that final check. A voters may stop after casting her vote, thus there is no guarantee that her ballot made it into the ballot box. However, if the ballot is present, it should not be possible to modify the corresponding vote.
• At most all corrupted voters. In particular, an adversary should not be able to add more votes than the number of voters he controls.
We refer the reader to [22] for the formal definition and point out that strong verifiability assumes that voting devices are honest. We first note that BeleniosRF cannot be strongly verifiable if revoting is allowed. Indeed, if a voter first casts a ballot b1 for a candidate v1, but later changes her mind and votes for v2, casting a new ballot b2, a malicious voting server may force the voter to keep the initial vote v1 by re-randomizing b1 instead of b2, and the voter would not be able to detect it. Therefore, in what follows, we assume that a no-revote policy is applied. We believe that no-revoting is not a real restriction since, as discussed in the introduction, this actually corresponds to the most common setting used in practice. By slightly generalizing the strong-verifiability transformation in [22, Section 4], we are able to show:
T h e o r e m 4. BeleniosRF is strongly verifiable if the underlying signature on randomizable ciphertexts scheme is unforgeable.
The transformation to strong verifiability in [22] consists in the voter signing with her private signing key usk a ballot b obtained via an existing voting protocol that is weakly verifiable (roughly speaking, weak verifiability assumes that the voting server is honest, e.g., it does not modify nor erase ballots). Next, the voter sends the triple (upk, b, σ) to the voting server. The latter, after validating the ballot b and verifying its signature σ, adds the triple (upk, b, σ) to the ballot box. At the end of the election, the voter checks that her ballot (upk, b, σ) appears in PBB by a simple search.
We generalize this transformation by allowing the voting server to add a transformed triple (upk, b , σ ) to the ballot box on input the voter's ballot (upk, b, σ), such that potentially b = b and σ = σ (in the original construction, one simply sets b = b and σ = σ). In our generalized transformation, the voter on input her cast ballot (upk, b, σ) checks whether there exists an entry (upk, b , σ ) in PBB such that (b , σ ) verifies under her key upk. Due to unforgeability of randomizable signatures on ciphertexts (cf. Section 3.3) and because of the no-revoting policy, this check guarantees that the new ballot b displayed in the bulletin board contains the same vote as the original ballot b cast by the voter.
Strong verifiability assumes that either the ballot box (i.e. the re-randomization server) or the registrar is honest. As pointed out in Section 1.2, the security of the generalized transformation described in the previous paragraph is jeopardized if this trust assumption is violated, as the existence of an entry (upk, b , σ ) in PBB would no longer guarantee that b contains the choice cast by the voter. In fact, an attacker controlling both the registrar and the voting server can insert entries (upk, b , σ ) in PBB that pass all tests but modified the voter's choice. This is due to the fact that the registrar knows each voter's private signing key. An obvious countermeasure is to let each voter generate their own signing key pair and simply ask the registrar to include the corresponding verification key in the list of eligible keys for the election.
Alternatively, one can thresholdize the role of the registrar (who simply sends a private signing key to each voter) so it becomes less likely for the attacker to obtain a voter's private key.
EFFICIENCY OF BELENIOSRF
The ballot encryption scheme we introduced is somewhat involved, especially since we use bit-by-bit Groth-Sahai proofs. For this reason, we benchmarked ballot creation on a number of potential client devices. We built a JavaScript implementation [2] of the voting process (encrypt, sign, prove) using the CertiVox IoT Crypto Library [17] . We used a BN curve on a 254-bit prime field. We considered the values k = 1, 5, 10 and 25. For homomorphic tallying, as used in Section 4, k represents the number of candidates in an election. If we switch to shuffle-based tallying, k is the length of the message, which means we can support up to 2 k candidates. As seen in Table 1 , recent devices can complete the required cryptographic operations in reasonable time for small values of k. We see that while the linear cost associated with the message size is the dominant factor, the constant factor is not negligible for low-end devices. While slower than the current Helios or Belenios implementation (which do not use elliptic curves), performance is acceptable, especially for modern devices. Moreover, our implementation is single-threaded with only rudimentary optimizations. By constructing proofs incrementally as the ballot is filled, we could amortize the linear part of the cost. Alternatively, we may increase performance by coding a native client, e.g. a smartphone app.
We expect that server performance for BeleniosRF will be less of a bottleneck. Compared to Helios, the main additional Table 1 : Time to encrypt, sign and perform GS proofs for ballots with a k-bit payload. This allows for up to k candidates with homomorphic tallying, or 2 k using shuffles.
and displays it on the public bulletin board. These instructions allow any voter with knowledge of a ballot b to produce an independent-looking ballotb, that will be accepted by the voting server and effectively contains a copy of the vote in b. Thus, the voting protocol [12] is not ballot-private. (Note that due to re-randomizing being allowed, the ballot box cannot discard copied votes, as they look like legitimate ones.)
CONCLUSIONS
We introduced the notion of strong receipt-freeness, where a malicious voter (i.e. vote-selling or coerced) cannot produce a receipt proving how she voted, whether the voter decided to act maliciously before, during or after casting the ballot.
Our adversarial model is close to the spirit of the seminal work on receipt-freeness by Benaloh and Tuinstra [8] .
Moreover, our definition builds on the recent work [9] , inheriting a simple, concise, and game-based definition. Such definitions are well-known for easing the job of conceiving and writing security proofs; a point we confirm by giving a new e-voting protocol that satisfies our definition in bilinear groups under the SXDH assumption in pairing groups, in the random oracle model. The protocol is built using ideas from a previous work [12] that claimed to have solved this problem. We show however that the previous voting scheme was not ballot-private, which is weaker than receipt-freeness.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme that is both receipt-free (in a strong sense) and has universal verifiability (in the sense of strong verifiability [22] ), without requiring the existence of an untappable channel, or the use of secure hardware tokens. We only require that the receiptfreeness adversary is not eavesdropping the communication between the voter and the voting server, and the existence of a re-randomization service. As a result, we overcome the impossibility result [19] , stating no scheme can be receipt-free and universally verifiable without an untappable channel. We achieve this by relying on a ballot box server that is entrusted to re-randomize ballots without changing its contents, in a publicly verifiable way [12] . Finally, we showed the feasibility of our approach by implementing a voting client in Javascript and measuring its performance in a number of platforms.
